

Southend-on-Sea Borough Council

Agenda
Item No.

Report of the Chief Executive & Town Clerk
to
Cabinet
on
27th June 2006

Report prepared by: Rob Tinlin

Pier Fire

Economic & Environmental Scrutiny Committee – Executive Councillors: M Foster & A Holland
A Part I Public Agenda Item

1. Purpose of Report

- 1.1 To report on the background to the major fire on Southend Pier in October 2005, its causes and the lessons to be learned for the future.

2. Recommendation

It is recommended that:-

- 2.1 **The report of the Chief Fire Officer, attached as Appendix 1, on the causes of the fire be noted.**
- 2.2 **The recommended actions arising from the fire, contained in section 12 of this report, be accepted and approved.**

3. Background

- 3.1 On the evening of 9th October 2005, a fire occurred on the Old Pier Head which resulted in serious damage to the Pier with the loss of some 110 metres of decking, damage to supports, damage to a restaurant and the loss of the south station, toilet block, pub, a further restaurant and gift shop.
- 3.2 The fire has led to major disruption to the operation of the Pier and the interruption or cessation of trading for several businesses.
- 3.3 The fire has been the subject of major investigations by the Essex Fire & Rescue Service (the Fire Service), Police and insurers together with a significant review by the Council.
- 3.4 I would like to formally record appreciation for the work of emergency service personnel, RNLI, Shell, Council staff and others in fighting the fire, in dealing with the aftermath, in bringing near-normal service back to the Pier, and in investigating the causes and in helping prepare this report.

4. The Fire

- 4.1 The various investigations suggest that the fire began in McGinty's Bar, probably around its disabled access door, at around 21.10 hrs and gradually took hold. All available close circuit television (CCTV) footage from Council and other sources have been reviewed as part of the various investigations. All cameras on the Pier were recording but none were under active monitoring. One camera begins to show a glow at around 21.19 hrs and fire is identified at around 21.29 hrs.

- 4.2 The Fire Service received the first telephone report of a fire on the Pier at 22.41 hrs. It also received a number of other alerts from a variety of different sources. The first fire appliance arrived at the Pier at 22.47 hrs, and the scale of the incident was rapidly escalated with a call for 10 appliances being made at 23.37 hrs. At this stage the Fire Service automatically notifies Essex County Council emergency planning service but this was not relayed to Southend.
- 4.3 By 00.20 hrs on Monday 10 October the Fire and Rescue Service had escalated the incident to a "plus 12" pumps, together with other support vehicles and equipment. The Fire Service also called for support from a fire boat and obtained assistance from Shell Coryton, with a fire tug arriving on site at 01.20 hrs.
- 4.4 On first arrival at the Pier the Fire Service was not immediately met, as per the Pier Evacuation Plan, by a member of staff as the caretaker was unaware of the fire, being involved in other defined duties. Consequently, the Fire Service properly gained access forcibly. The Fire Service was faced with a significant fire approximately one mile into the estuary along the narrow Pier stem. The train service is licenced under the Railway Acts and requires authorised and trained drivers. Initially there was no-one with expertise to use the train and, in line with the agreed emergency evacuation plan, the caretaker transported the fire crews by motorised buggy along the Pier, avoiding any significant loss of time. Indeed, the insurer's investigators suggest that, even if the train had been available for use immediately, fire fighters would not have arrived at the south station much more quickly than they did by using the buggy. The train was brought into use shortly after 23.00 hrs after a Pier & Foreshore Supervisor able to drive the train was called out.
- 4.5 The location of the fire and the nature of the Pier undoubtedly hampered the operation of the Fire Service. The fire had also severed access to the south end of the Pier and the Fire Service relied upon the RNLI to ferry crew to the new Pier head to fight or contain the fire from the south side.
- 4.6 The Council permits a number of sea anglers to use the Pier for night fishing and operates a signing-in system. The log indicated that there were potentially four members of the public unaccounted for on the Pier and a search, in accordance with the agreed plan, was activated. Whilst this proved to be a false alarm, HM Coastguard, the RAF Search & Rescue helicopter, Southend, Sheerness and Gravesend lifeboats, police, fire and Port of London launches and the cockle vessel Catherine all responded to address the missing people call.
- 4.7 The "new" seawater fire fighting pumps did operate, supported by the emergency generator on the new Pier head. The Fire Service encountered early problems in sourcing the keys for the "American-style" water hydrants but then utilised this source of water until encountering a loss in pressure. This was due to the pipes being fractured. This may have been caused by the collapse of the Pier and buildings. There is also evidence of melt damage although it is unclear whether this occurred before or after the collapse.
- 4.8 The pipes were not fitted with sector valves which may have allowed the Fire Service to maintain use of this water source following collapse or failure at the point of the fire. The pumps subsequently ceased operation when the emergency generator was accidentally hit and shorted-out by high-pressure water from the fire tug.
- 4.9 There is a second water source utilising the original fresh water supply from the shore which is carried by pipes on the surface alongside the railway. This is the pipework which featured heavily in press photography in subsequent days. This water source was utilised but its use did encounter some confusion which caused some delays. The supply has a restrictor valve to reduce pressure to address the normal needs of the Pier. This valve has associated bypass valves in place to allow increased water pressure for exactly such an eventuality. These valves were repositioned as part of the Pier Hill redevelopment but installed with inaccurate guidance markings. The contractor has accepted responsibility for having done so. There was also some confusion concerning redundant frost protection valves in the Pier Head. These pipes clearly fractured at some stage in the vicinity of the South Station but not until daylight.
- 4.10 Having considered the information available to me, I am of the view that given the scale and intensity of the fire by the time the Fire Service arrived, any difficulties or damage to the seawater or fresh water pipework are likely to have had limited impact on the avoidance of

damage. The lack of direction or suppression of the fire in its early stages effectively rendered operational tactics substantially irrelevant in mitigating the impact of the fire.

- 4.11 The fire crews were assisted by light portable pumps and the fire boat, which was able to direct substantial amounts of water onto the fire. The extent of the fire meant that there were pockets of flame which were almost inaccessible to both the fire boat and the fire fighters, and these pockets continued to smoulder and reignite for some days afterwards.
- 4.12 The CCTV Control Room became aware of the fire when fire appliances arrived at the Pier. As will be discussed later, the cameras located on the Pier were not linked to the Control Room. There was no clear escalation plan and this only occurred after the Control Room line manager was called in. The Assistant Director responsible for the Pier and the appropriate Portfolio Holder were called out, as were other Pier & Foreshore staff. The system did not trigger a call out for the Council's Emergency Planning Officer (EPO) until approximately 24.00 hrs. He immediately called out the Chief Executive. On arrival at the Pier, the EPO assumed the key liaison role with the emergency services.
- 4.13 There was intense local, national and global media interest, and the Council's media team managed the pressure from arrival on site at approximately 02.00 hrs and over subsequent days and weeks.
- 4.14 The Leader of the Council was called out at approximately 03.00 hrs and the other Group Leaders notified at approximately 06.00 hrs.

5. The Cause of the Fire

- 5.1 As a direct result of the scale of the fire damage, the lack of witnesses and inconclusive CCTV coverage, the Fire Service has concluded its investigation with the view that the cause is undetermined (see **Appendix 1**). Investigations do suggest that the fire probably started in McGinty's Bar in the vicinity of its disabled access.
- 5.2 There has been much speculation in the town about the cause and various possible causes have been suggested. There is no conclusive evidence to support any of this speculation. However, a number of issues which have been suggested do raise cause for improvements in practice for future Pier operations including the implications for cigarette smoking on the Pier, the electricity supply loadings to operations on the Pier, the supervision and control of electrical appliances and the siting of infrastructure such as cabling and piping.
- 5.3 Fire alarm systems and fire sprinklers were not a feature of the buildings on the Pier and the Fire Service is of the view that, had they been fitted, these facilities would have raised the alarm earlier, helped control the fire and allowed the Fire Service to address the fire at an earlier stage in its development.

6. The Fire Fighting Water Supplies

- 6.1 The Pier was serviced by two water supplies for fire fighting, as shown on the plan at **Appendix 2**.
- 6.2 **The principal, sea water, fire fighting main** was installed and brought into use in 2001, comprising pumps to pull sea water from the permanent water off the end of the Pier into holding tanks and then into a main pipe reaching to a point to the north of the South Station. This system, and the sewage transfer system installed at the same time, were designed by specialist consultants Bradwell Consultants Ltd. Evidence suggests that this was not a happy or successful contract, with a range of subsequent difficulties and modifications. The relationship with Bradwell would not appear to have been satisfactorily resolved. From interviews and other evidence, the design and implementation of the works on water and sewage systems were not satisfactory and have required several modifications and remediation.
- 6.3 The pipework was suspended below the Pier decking to isolate and protect it. This would not appear to be an unreasonable proposition subject to its implementation. Given the nature and intensity of the fire the pipes would have been subject to the same challenges whether sited above or below the decking, particularly the implications of heat exposure or structural

collapse. There would, however, appear to have been issues regarding the means of installation of the pipework which merit further specialist analysis.

- 6.4 Bradwell was responsible for the design and installation of the systems on behalf of, and reporting to, the client, in this case the Technical & Environmental Services Department acting for the Leisure service. Bradwell specified the use of High Performance Polyethylene (HPPE) pipework to reduce both capital and maintenance costs. Whilst this pipe has regularly been described as “plastic” the description does not accurately portray its construction. It is, in fact, heavy industrial pipe with, in this case, a specified 250 mm outside diameter and a wall thickness of 22.7-25.2 mm. It has been argued that the pipework, when in use, benefits from the cooling effects of the water it contains under pressure. Evidence from Council and Fire Service files shows that Bradwell consulted the Fire Service which questioned the suitability of the specification at the time. The Fire Service has, however, advised me that, when Bradwell initially contacted the Service, it did not offer any advice regarding the suitability of the HDPE pipework but requested that Bradwell advise the Service of the Standard (BS/EN etc) to which the pipework would conform, in order that an informed opinion could be offered. This information was never forthcoming. Subsequent research by the Fire Service has shown that installation of the pipework could have been undertaken in accordance with two British Standards, both of which require, where plastic pipe is used, that it be buried, or encased in a fire-resisting structure, for protection against heat exposure. On this basis, the means of fire main installation employed by Bradwell did not comply with any relevant technical standard. Bradwell did indicate that maintenance costs and energy use were factors in the revised specification, but I have not been able to locate any subsequent justification for the specification change by Bradwell or challenge to the pipe specification from the Fire Service since installation.
- 6.5 The work designed and carried out by and for Bradwell has resulted in a number of difficulties and subsequent modifications and cost.
- 6.6 When the New Pier Head works were carried out modifications to the system were carried out, including the introduction of “American style” hydrants which would seem to have been for aesthetic reasons. These hydrants use non-standard keys which are not carried on fire appliances. The keys are located in the Pier train cabs. Locating the special keys on the night of the fire would seem to have caused some delay. However, given the intensity of the fire and its location, the Fire Service has not identified this as proving to be a significant issue.
- 6.7 The sea water fire fighting main did not contain any isolation valves which would have allowed damaged sections to be isolated and the rest of the system to be operated. Interviews with Council staff involved in the works suggest that this omission was the result of cost management. Had the valves been installed, it is probable that the main would have been usable for longer.
- 6.8 There have been many and varied rumours about the new sea water fire fighting main. Most are completely inaccurate. The low tide made no difference as the pumps are fully submerged in permanent water at all times. The pumps worked and water was used by the Fire Service subject to the points identified in this report. The fire fighting system was inspected on the Saturday immediately before the fire and was found to be fully operational, including all hydrants. The system was not the subject of any recommendations or reservations following the major exercise in Summer 2005 (which tested the procedures and facilities in place for major incidents on the Pier and involved all relevant emergency services) or in regular checks.
- 6.9 **A secondary fresh water fire fighting main** supply was also available. This main predated the sea water main. It is located above deck level and is, as a result, more visible. It is of a lesser specification than the sea water main but does have isolation valves fitted. The hydrant covers for the bypass valves on Pier Hill had incorrect guidance imprinted on the undersides and this could have led to some delay and needs to be rectified. The frost protection valve, which is now redundant, needs to be removed to avoid confusion and the available fire instructions reviewed regarding positioning.
- 6.10 There would appear to be deficiencies in the specification and installation of the sea water fire fighting mains. Whilst these deficiencies would not seem to be contributory to the total damage caused by the fire, the situation raises major concerns for the Council and challenges for its reputation and for the continuing safeguarding of the Pier. The history of the installation

is a chequered one and not a satisfactory one. It is my considered view that a series of actions must be taken with regard to both of the fire fighting mains. The Council should now appoint an independent and respected expert to reassess both fire-fighting mains and make recommendations for their modification to secure their future integrity. Such investigations must include the active involvement of the Fire Service. The Council has been investigating recovery action with respect to the sea water main. The opportunity for recovery from Bradwell or its insurers is being explored.. However, I consider that it is likely that the Council will incur expenditure if pipework needs to be replaced; our insurers will only cover like for like replacement costs as part of the fire reinstatement if recovery from Bradwell proves impossible. On behalf of the Council I have already appointed its independent external auditors, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, to investigate the procurement and installation of the sea water fire fighting main to identify any procedural issues.

- 6.11 The use of fire alarm systems and sprinkler systems needs to be reviewed, for both future buildings and for those which exist at the Pier Entrance.

7. CCTV

7.1 The Pier hosted a number of close-circuit television cameras, owned by individual operators and by the Council. The Council had 20 cameras on the Pier, 10 of which are on the Pier Head. These are shown on the plan attached as **Appendix 3**. The cameras are linked to recording apparatus in the Pier offices and there are fibre optic cable links between the Pier and the CCTV Control Room. Investigation following the fire identified that the cable link had been severed, allegedly by construction works in the town centre, for some months and was inoperable. The cause of the damage has not been identified or proven. Whilst I am advised that the link has now been restored, the Pier cameras were not, as a result, being actively monitored other than on an occasional basis by the Pier caretaker as part of his regular duties. Interviews have also highlighted differing views on the existence of a monitoring regime for the Pier cameras.

7.2 The Pier also hosted other CCTV cameras owned and operated by tenants. These were not linked to the Pier system but have been used by investigators to try to determine the cause and seat of the fire.

7.3 Whilst investigation has determined that it is unlikely that this fire would have been identified at an earlier time, had the Council's CCTV cameras, in their configuration at the time, been monitored actively it is possible that active monitoring of all cameras on the Pier could identify and raise the alert for any future incidents.

7.4 It is my considered view that the CCTV regime should be reviewed to ensure that all Council-owned cameras are part of the central monitoring regime and that the Control Room has a clear remit and procedures for such monitoring as part of a full incident procedure. The integrity of the links between the cameras must be of a high corporate priority and maintained accordingly.

7.5 Once restored, the camera locations on the Pier should be reviewed to ensure optimum coverage of all areas and all cameras owned and operated by third parties must be linked to the Council's Control Room as a condition of lease.

8. Call Out Systems and Communications

8.1 The fire identified deficiencies in the Council call-out arrangements associated with major emergencies such as the Pier fire. The CCTV Control Room appears to have had no clear procedures and there appears to be differing systems across the Council.

8.2 The CCTV Control Room, once it became aware of the fire, called out its line manager who, in turn, called out the Assistant Director with responsibility for the Pier. He attended the scene and called out the appropriate Portfolio Holder. It was a subsequent and unscripted call by the Control Room to the Council's Emergency Planning Officer (EPO) which then escalated the corporate response. This is unacceptable. The Control Room call out guide has been suitably amended and work is underway to formalise a corporate call-out regime for any future major incident. The Control Room now has clear advice on call-out in case of major incidents. It also became apparent that the Fire Service alerts the Essex Emergency Planning Team for

incidents above a pre-determined scale. This alert did not cascade to the Southend EPO and this has now been rectified following discussions between the Council and the Fire Service.

9. Night Angling and Other Out-Of-Hours Use of the Pier

- 9.1 The Council allows a limited number of sea anglers to fish from the Pier at night under permit. A sign-in system operates to ensure that there is knowledge of who is on the Pier if an emergency arises. It became clear on the night of the fire that the system was not being operated consistently. Four people had signed on to the Pier but had not signed off the Pier, and this resulted in the pre-determined Pier evacuation plan being activated to search for possible missing people. This turned out to be a false alarm but caused alarm and public concern.
- 9.2 There is no reason for fishing to be debarred from the Pier, but the recording system for attendance must be made more robust and action taken when any system is proven to be abused by individuals.

10. Property and Tenants

- 10.1 The Council had a number of tenants on the Pier at the time of the fire. Some of these tenants have been operating on the Pier for some years. The actions consequent on the fire have highlighted a range of issues related to the management of Council leases, which need to be addressed to ensure consistency and certainty.
- 10.2 The Council insures the Pier structure, decking and the buildings it operates (railway station, toilets, generator building) and, in the main, the lessees were expected to insure the buildings they occupied. However, the properties and operations on the Pier at the time of the fire had leases which varied with regard to their terms and conditions. There were varying conditions regarding insurance cover, including the scale and nature of this cover. This has led to issues for the tenants, the need for considerable additional negotiation and greater complexity in resolving insurance liability.
- 10.3 The arrangements for agreeing specialist insurance elements in leases has been dealt with by the property service with varied involvement by the Council's specialist insurance team. In future, we need to ensure that there are consistent insurance provisions and to alter the provisions in existing leases where possible. Insurance conditions must be reviewed to ensure that they adequately safeguard the Council, and the public interest in Council properties and policies regularly checked where tenants have to insure their properties. Lease conditions must involve both legal and insurance input to ensure consistency and appropriateness.
- 10.4 The leases given by the Council need to be reviewed in terms of robustness and policing to ensure that alterations and changes in servicing of properties are the subject of express approval and monitoring by the Council. All leases must also take greater account of the need for, and provision of, fire monitoring and suppression equipment and procedures. The investigators conclude that had automatic fire detection systems linked to the Pier and Foreshore offices and a sprinkler system been installed the fire would probably have been discovered earlier and confined to McGinty's Bar. All buildings on the Pier should be required to be fitted with fire monitoring and alarm systems and fire suppressions systems such as sprinkler systems. All operations must also be required to include sealed and fire resistant separate containers for the storage of waste.
- 10.5 The remaining buildings on the Pier must be reviewed to assess the need for the installation of fire monitoring, alarm and suppression systems.
- 10.6 In one instance a property and operation, undamaged by the fire, did not have an extant lease, planning and listed building consent or, importantly, insurance cover. This property has been the subject of some considerable media coverage and criticism of the Council. However, this situation posed serious potential consequences for the Council and the Pier. To ensure that there has been insurance cover for any further incidents on the Pier, the Council has had to ensure insurance cover for the property at its own cost since October last and has faced a consequent excess of £250,000 if any incident occurred associated with the building. This property has been the subject of separate Cabinet consideration and action has now been

taken to remove the property. Procedures need to be reviewed and made more robust to avoid similar situations occurring in other property leased by the Council.

- 10.7 It is my view that arrangements for the management and control of any future leases on the Pier be reviewed and co-ordinated.

11. Conclusions

- 11.1 There is no conclusive cause for the fire on the Pier in October 2005. This outcome is much to do with the severity of the fire and the length of time it burned. The blaze, at its height, had a core temperature exceeding 1200 degrees Celsius. The ferocity of the fire caused a large part of the structure to collapse into the Thames, with the resultant loss of much evidence.

- 11.2 Investigations suggest that the fire started in McGinty's Bar.

- 11.3 As with any major incident, it tests procedures and identifies improvements needed in those procedures. This fire is no different and this report highlights a number of areas where the Council and its partner organisations are already improving systems or need to do so. The reports and investigations highlight that some seemingly obvious issues, such as the pipework materials, were far less critical on the day of the fire than other infrastructure which, if available, could have raised the alarm earlier and reduced the damage. Hence this report focuses attention on the need for detection, alarm and sprinkler systems and improved CCTV coverage to provide early alert and management of any fire.

- 11.4 The fire has also highlighted concerns about certain infrastructure, primarily the recently installed sea water fire fighting main. The means of specifying and installing the main have identifiable flaws and this report proposes a full review of that work to learn and to ensure the system is robust.

- 11.5 There has been much natural, if impatient, pressure for an early pronouncement about the cause of the fire. This pressure has quite properly maintained attention on the need for appropriate public reporting to provide closure of the fire, reassurance and any necessary improvements. The fire was large, intense, difficult to fight and difficult to analyse. The fire needed careful investigation, some of that requiring specialist analysis. That takes time. Early and partial statements could have been inaccurate, misleading and potentially detrimental to the interests of the Council and the funding of the renewal of the Pier. This report has been produced using the final findings of the Fire Service and the insurers' forensic teams, and is therefore the most accurate statement possible.

12. Recommendations

- 12.1 As a result of the analysis of the investigations by the Council, the Fire Service and the insurers' forensic team I make the following recommendations:-

12.2 *Fire Fighting Water Supply Systems*

- 12.2.1 The Council should, as a matter of urgency, appoint an independent and respected expert to reassess both sea water and fresh water fire-fighting mains, and make recommendations for their modification to secure their future integrity. Such investigations must include the active involvement of the Fire Service.
- 12.2.2 The Council should appoint an independent person to investigate the processes and levels of accountability for the appointment and management and implementation of the work to install the sea water fire main, and identify opportunities for improvements to other tendering exercises. PricewaterhouseCoopers has been appointed to carry out this task.
- 12.2.3 When the work to restore the Pier is carried out, the design should incorporate safe ducting systems to hold and protect the essential infrastructure such as power cables and water supplies.

- 12.2.4 A review of the security of the emergency generator housing should be undertaken to assess if further modifications are necessary to safeguard the generator from eventualities such as being shorted by high pressure water jets.

12.3 **Fire Precautions**

- 12.3.1 All new buildings on the Pier must be fitted with fire monitoring, alarm and containment (e.g. sprinkler) systems. Fire alarm systems must be linked to a 24 hour monitoring service.
- 12.3.2 All new buildings on the Pier must include fire-secure locked storage facilities for waste.
- 12.3.3 The remaining buildings on the Pier should, as a matter of urgency, be surveyed and assessed for the installation of fire monitoring, alarm and containment systems.
- 12.3.4 Procedures should be put into place for the regular testing and maintenance of these new systems.
- 12.3.5 Arrangements have been made for the Pier to have installed a fire information box, readily accessible to the fire service, containing all critical information on services, contacts and with all necessary keys for accessing infrastructure. This must be regularly updated.
- 12.3.6 Training in driving the Pier trains should be provided for a wider range of essential staff from the Council, the Fire Service and the RNLI to allow ready use of the trains in time of emergency. Such training should be annually refreshed.
- 12.3.7 Fire and other emergency procedures for the Pier should be reviewed, in varying circumstances, with the appropriate emergency services. The current practice arrangements should be enhanced to cover varying circumstances.
- 12.3.8 Links between the Fire Service and the Council's Emergency Planning Service must be strengthened and actions are being taken to do so.
- 12.3.9 The role and duties of the night caretaker should be reviewed to specify the level of fire and safety duties.
- 12.3.10 Health and safety monitoring responsibilities for all Council operations and assets should be brought into a single area of responsibility to ensure consistency.

12.4 **Pier Operations**

- 12.4.1 The registration system for out-of-hours access to the Pier must be reviewed and strengthened to ensure that there is an accurate record of those on the Pier at any time. Accountability should be placed on those using the Pier to properly use the system or lose the right to access the Pier out of hours.

12.5 **Emergency Planning Matters**

- 12.5.1 The Council's call-out procedures should be reviewed by the Emergency Planning Officer, and rationalised to provide a clear corporate system that safeguards the Council's role and management of emergencies and other major incidents. Each department of the Council should nominate an emergency planning and business continuity liaison officer to work with the Emergency Planning Officer.
- 12.5.2 The Council's Major Emergency Plan should be reviewed in light of the Pier fire to ensure its robustness.

12.6 **CCTV Operations**

- 12.6.1 A full review of the role, operation and accountability of the Council's CCTV management and monitoring system should be carried out. This review should

analyse the confusion and failures in the CCTV network and monitoring at the time of the fire, and define the future role and span of responsibilities.

- 12.6.2 The location and security of the CCTV recording systems on the Pier should be reviewed to ensure adequate fire protection.

12.7 **Leasehold Arrangements**

- 12.7.1 A full review should be carried out into the arrangements for the management and control of the leases on the Pier, with the intention to achieve improvements to the systems operated by the Council. This review should include the background to the lease arrangements in place on the Pier, recommendations for improvements and a review of the implications for other leases across the Borough.
- 12.7.2 A review of the insurance arrangements for property leased from the Council should be carried out to ensure appropriate and adequate cover, properly protecting the interests of the Council, and with responsibility lying with the Council's specialist insurance team.
- 12.7.3 Arrangements should be reviewed and strengthened to avoid circumstances where tenants continue to operate in Council properties without extant leases, insurance and all necessary consents.
- 12.7.4 Some of these recommendations will be deliverable within the resources of the Council and some are covered by insurance. Some will apply to others such as any future tenants or operators on the Pier. There may be scope for some recovery from third parties. However, it must be recognised that a number of these recommendations will have resource implications for the Council. Where this is the case further reports will be brought to Cabinet for consideration.

13. **Background Papers**

- 13.1 The background papers used in this report are held by the Chief Executive & Town Clerk.

14. **Appendices**

- 14.1 The following appendices are included in this report:-
- 14.1.1 **Appendix 1** – Report of the Chief Fire Officer
- 14.1.2 **Appendix 2** – Plan showing water supplies on the Pier
- 14.1.3 **Appendix 3** – Plan showing CCTV cover on the Pier